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THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 





The creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) has been one of the 
boldest progressive moves in the history of international relations. At the heart 
of the Rome Statute is a commitment to the spirit and principle of international 
criminal justice. States under the jurisdiction of the ICC agree to cede 
sovereignty over individual perpetrators suspected of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes unless they are able and willing to prosecute 
perpetrators of these crimes at home. Even heads of state have not been 
immune from the formal legal authority of the ICC. 
Given the reach of its ambitions, it is unsurprising that the ICC has struggled 
to achieve some of its goals. It has, though, become a focal point for a vibrant 
and committed network of international advocates, lawyers, and civil society 
organizations committed to advancing international criminal justice.1 States also 
recognize the ICC’s importance. No fewer than 123 states have ratified the 
Rome Statute.2 Among both states and, especially, nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs), the ICC’s authority is derived from what it is, especially 
the principles it embraces and the commitments it espouses. 
What the ICC does, though, has elicited mixed reactions. In many instances, 
ICC investigations or arrest warrants have provoked a backlash, casting a 
shadow over not only the situations it investigates, but also over the Court. 
States that remain outside the ICC have protested vehemently when they come 
under its jurisdiction. Sudan, for example, has waged an active campaign against 
the ICC.3 This took on a new dimension in 2009 when the Chief Prosecutor, 
Luis Moreno Ocampo, announced an arrest warrant against the President of 
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 1.  This has been true even in Africa, when states have contested the ICC’s authority. See, e.g., 
Civil Society Rallies Support for Hague Court, ALLAFRICA (Oct. 7, 2013), http://allafrica.com 
/view/group/main/main/id/00026803.html. 
 2.  The States Parties to the Rome Statute, https://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states 
%20parties/Pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20rome%20statute.aspx. 
 3.  Plans for this anti-ICC campaign were announced almost immediately after the arrest warrant 
for President Bashir was issued. Sudan Plans to Undertake Intensive Campaign Against ICC Decision, 
SUDAN TRIBUNE (Mar. 5, 2009), http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article30381. 
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Sudan, Omar al-Bashir. Russia and China have rejected the ICC’s authority 
from the outset and have continued to protest that the ICC violates national 
sovereignty. The fact that both Russia and China are protected from the 
purview of the ICC by their power to veto Security Council Resolutions has 
failed to mute their critiques of the Court. 
The United States has been a strong proponent of international criminal 
justice and yet has also refused to become a member of the ICC. Instead, it has 
engaged selectively with the ICC, sometimes serving as a staunch supporter and 
at other times mounting a vocal challenge to its authority. This challenge took 
on a dramatic form when Palestine announced its intention to join the ICC.  
The United States attempted to block Palestine’s membership, threatening to 
cut aid to the Palestinian Authority (PA) if it did not abandon this effort.4 More 
remarkable though, is the fact that several member states, each of which has 
voluntarily ratified the Rome Statute, have also challenged the ICC’s authority. 
After arrest warrants were issued for Kenya’s political elites, Kenya protested 
vehemently. Later, the government took its struggle to the African Union. In 
September 2013, the African Union held a summit to discuss the possibility of a 
collective African withdrawal from the ICC.5 When this failed, they unified to 
contest the Court’s authority, voting sitting heads of state in Africa immunity 
from the Court’s jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, and war 
crimes.6 
Scholars debate the impact of backlash on the authority of the ICC and on 
the status of international criminal justice. Some human rights scholars have 
argued that backlash is a regular occurrence, even a natural step, in the 
development and consolidation of new norms.7 Others argue that the 
consequences of a backlash from powerful spoilers can be far more pernicious, 
especially in contexts where existing institutions are weak.8 Alter, Helfer, and 
Madsen propose an alternative framework for evaluating the ICC. They 
compare the formal authority of international courts to their authority in 
practice. At a practical level, they suggest that authority may vary significantly 
across distinct audiences.9 A court’s “narrow” authority is defined in terms of its 
 
 4.  Jessica Schulberg, 75 Senators Want to Punish Palestine Before it Can Accuse Israel, NEW 
REPUBLIC (Feb. 3, 2015), https://newrepublic.com/article/120953/senators-threaten-cut-palestinian-
funding-over-icc-membership. 
 5.  African Union Summit on ICC Pullout over Ruto Trial, BBC NEWS (Sept. 20, 2013),  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-24173557. 
 6.  African Leaders Vote Themselves Immunity from New Court, THE GUARDIAN, (July 3, 2014),  
http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/jul/03/african-leaders-vote-immunity-human-
rights-court. 
 7.  Thomas Risse & Kathryn Sikkink, The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and 
Domestic Change, in THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC 
CHANGE (Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp & Kathryn Sikkink eds., 1999). 
 8.  Jack Snyder & Leslie Vinjamuri, Trials and Errors: Principle and Pragmatism in Strategies of 
International Justice, 28 INT’L SECURITY, Winter 2003–04. 
 9.  See Karen J. Alter, Laurence R. Helfer & Mikael Rask Madsen, How Context Shapes the 
Authority of International Courts, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2016, at 9. 
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authority with respect to those that are directly involved in a particular case. 
They find that it is more common for courts to have “narrow authority” than to 
have “extensive authority” over a broader set of actors, including international 
legal scholars or international civil society. Courts also rely on partners to help 
enforce their mandates. These “compliance partners” constitute a court’s 
“intermediate authority.”10 
The ICC challenges this finding. Recognition of the ICC’s authority has 
been stronger among international NGOs, civil society organizations, and 
international human rights lawyers than among actors that are directly 
implicated in specific situations and cases. For this transnational network of 
justice proponents, ICC authority is intrinsic to what the Court is and is 
underpinned first and foremost by a moral, legal, and institutional commitment 
to accountability for crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes. At the 
heart of this commitment is the belief and expectation that international 
criminal justice must be independent from politics. 
By contrast, material support from states has been contingent on what the 
ICC does, rather than what it is. State support has been harder to rally when the 
ICC’s investigations impinge on states’ political interests or threaten to impede 
peace talks. But the ICC has been hard pressed to secure critical resources and 
state backing when a state’s leaders or those of its allies come under scrutiny.11 
The upshot of this is that the ICC faces an “authority paradox.” On the one 
hand, its authority among civil society organizations and transnational 
advocates is intimately wrapped up in what the ICC is, and especially, in the 
assumption that justice must be independent from politics. On the other hand, 
the ICC is structurally dependent on states to enforce its mandate, most 
especially to help arrest perpetrators of international crimes. This dependence 
undercuts the ICC’s flexibility to manage the conflicting interests of its different 
constituencies.12 Actions that help secure the support of powerful states 
threaten to alienate civil society. NGOs have challenged the ICC for applying 
“double standards”; for example, when it targets rebels and fails to 
acknowledge state crimes, or, in the case of Security Council referrals, when 
powerful states write in clauses that exempt their own nationals from ICC 
authority.13 
 
 10. Id. at 10. Karen J. Alter uses the term “compliance partners” in her book on international 
courts, THE NEW TERRAIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: COURTS, POLITICS, RIGHTS (2014). 
 11.  For a powerful discussion of the ICC’s tendency to accommodate the interests of powerful 
states, see DAVID BOSCO, ROUGH JUSTICE: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT IN A WORLD OF 
POWER POLITICS (2014). 
 12.  An extensive literature explores the relationship between politics, law, and the ICC. For a 
review of this literature see DAVID BOSCO, ROUGH JUSTICE: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
IN A WORLD OF POWER POLITICS (2014); Leslie Vinjamuri & Jack Snyder, Politics and Law in 
Transitional Justice, 18 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 303 (2015). 
 13.  UN Security Council: Address Inconsistency in ICC Referrals: Use Debate on International 
Court to Forge a More Principled Relationship, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Oct. 16, 2012), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/10/16/un-security-council-address-inconsistency-icc-referrals. For a 
similar argument, see Richard Dicker, The International Criminal Court (ICC) and Double Standards of 
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This article proceeds in three parts. First, it reviews the categories of 
authority that Alter, Helfer, and Madsen set out to frame their study of 
international courts. For these scholars, authority refers to the steps actors take 
to acknowledge and support international courts. This article suggests that 
politics have shaped the extent of the ICC’s authority among state actors. Next, 
it considers implicit claims about the ICC’s authority in contested areas. More 
specifically, it evaluates the oft-heard claim that self-referrals by African states 
of crimes on their own territory, together with the large number of African 
states that have joined the ICC, suggest that the ICC has strong support in 
Africa.14 Third, this article suggests that UN Security Council (UNSC) referrals 
are not a robust indicator of the ICC’s authority among major powers.  State 
support of referrals has frequently proved to be an empty gesture with little 
subsequent follow-through. Too often, states have provided only minimal 
support to ensure the success of investigations, arrests, and trials. Finally, this 
article concludes by underscoring the paradox of authority at the heart of the 
ICC. 
II 
AUTHORITY AS A MEASURE OF ICC SUCCESS 
How can we make sense of the ICC’s record? International Relations 
scholars have suggested several explanations for states’ failure to support 
international institutions and norms. Börzel and Risse argue that especially in 
areas of limited statehood, states may simply lack the capacity to comply with 
human rights norms.15 But the Rome Statute was designed specifically to 
overcome this problem.  The complementarity principle differentiates states 
that are willing and able to hold trials for the perpetrators of mass atrocities 
from those that are not, granting the ICC authority over crimes that take place 
in those states in this latter category. Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui argue that 
human rights treaty commitments offer a relatively low-cost mechanism for 
soliciting positive feedback in the international arena.16 Support for a referral 
may simply be one additional and comparatively cheap step that states can take 
to demonstrate their role as good world citizens.  If this is the case, it is not 
necessarily surprising that states fail to follow through. Regardless of whether 
states have good intentions or bad intentions, they enjoy a relatively cost-free 
 
International Justice, in THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 3 
(Carsten Stahn ed., 2015). See also Louise Arbour, The Relationship between the ICC and the UN 
Security Council, 20 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: REV. OF MULTILATERALISM AND INT’L ORGS.199 
(2014). 
 14.  Kenneth Roth, Africa Attacks the International Criminal Court, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, (Feb. 6, 
2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/feb/06/africa-attacks-international-criminal-
court/. 
 15.  Tanja A. Börzel & Thomas Risse, Human Rights in Areas of Limited Statehood: The New 
Agenda, in The Persistent Power of Human Rights 63 (Thomas Risse, Thomas Ropp & Kathryn 
Sikkink eds., 2013). 
 16.  Emilie M. Hafner-Burton & Kiyotero Tsutsui, Justice Lost! The Failure of International 
Human Rights Law To Matter Where Needed Most, 44 J. PEACE RES. 407, 413–15 (2007).  
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membership in joining and even referring situations to the ICC. Danner and 
Simmons have suggested that the decision to join is sincere and may 
demonstrate an intention. States join the ICC to tie their hands and make a 
credible commitment to reducing civil violence.17 More recent work by Jo and 
Simmons argues that states that have ratified the Rome Statute have indeed 
killed fewer civilians.18 
 Alter, Helfer, and Madsen suggest that authority is critical to explaining 
international courts. Authority refers to the steps that actors take to 
acknowledge and practically support a court’s work, including its operations, 
decisions, and judgments. They identify four types of authority: narrow legal 
authority, intermediate authority, extensive legal authority, and popular 
authority.19 A court may have robust authority in one category but 
comparatively weak authority in another.  Narrow authority refers to the 
relevant actors in the ICC’s “situations,” primarily rebel actors that are targeted 
by indictments or public officials. The intermediate authority of the ICC 
extends beyond these parties to include what Alter refers to as its “compliance 
partners”: those states and other actors that are critical in providing the ICC 
support in gathering information, conducting arrests, or financing its 
operations.20 These may include governments that refer a situation to the ICC, 
or in the case of Security Council referrals, states with a seat on the Security 
Council. The ICC’s extensive legal authority has drawn on a vast network of 
civil society activists, legal academics, international NGOs, bar associations, and 
other justice entrepreneurs. 
While each of these explanations offers some insights into state behavior 
before international courts, politics has played a crucial role in shaping the 
authority of international courts. In states with limited institutional capacity, 
politics has been integral to states’ decisions to support or challenge ICC 
investigations.  The same has been true in states with consolidated rule of law 
institutions that have been called on to support the ICC’s work in third party 
states. Politics, especially states’ political interests in peace, security, and 
stability, has been a strong driver of states’ choices to recognize or withhold 
support from the ICC. When the ICC’s pursuits undermine states’ interests, 
states have been quick to defer or evade ICC justice. 
 
 17.  Beth A. Simmons & Allison Danner, Credible Commitments and the International Criminal 
Court, 64 INT’L ORG. 225, 232 (2010). 
 18.  Hyeran Jo and Beth A. Simmons, Can the International Criminal Court Deter Atrocity? (Dec. 
18, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2552820 (an updated version of this is 
forthcoming in International Organization).  
 19.  Alter, Helfer & Madsen, supra note 9, at 9–12. 
 20.  On the idea of compliance partners, see KAREN ALTER, THE NEW TERRAIN OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: COURTS, POLITICS, RIGHTS (2014). 
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III  
SELF-REFERRALS, AFRICA, AND ICC AUTHORITY 
The ICC celebrated its ten-year anniversary in 2012. Scholars and 
practitioners have taken an active interest in evaluating the impact of the 
Court’s activities.21 At first glance, the ICC appears to have been remarkably 
successful. In a little over a decade, it has opened nine situations and has 
undertaken nearly as many preliminary investigations.22 At 123 members, a 
majority of the world’s states have ratified the Rome Statute, in effect 
voluntarily agreeing to delegate authority for prosecution of genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and war crimes to the ICC, unless a state is willing and able to 
prosecute these perpetrators at home. 
There are also other signs that the ICC’s authority has increased. The U.S. 
stance toward the ICC appears to have softened. Although it initially was a 
strong proponent of a permanent international criminal court, the United States 
later refused to sign or ratify the Rome Statute.23 The decision to support an 
independent prosecutor combined with the failure of the United States to 
secure an exemption from ICC justice for its citizens secured its fate as a 
nonmember. The U.S. government proceeded to negotiate bilateral immunity 
agreements with individual state members of the ICC. These agreements 
required states to declare that no American nationals would be turned over to 
the ICC. If a state refused to agree to this, then it would forgo military aid from 
the United States.24 
The U.S. efforts to restrict the ICC were initially seen as a major hindrance 
to its success. Even when the United States supported the ICC, it did so through 
a strategy of passive acquiescence rather than active support. When the Security 
Council voted to refer Darfur to the ICC, the United States abstained from 
voting. This effectively enabled the Resolution to pass.25 
This has been at least partially remedied during the Obama Administration. 
Stephen Rapp, Ambassador-at-large for War Crimes in the U.S. Department of 
State, led the United States in its more active and constructive approach to the 
ICC. This reflected Rapp’s own experience and commitment to international 
criminal justice but also a period when the United States sought to engage more 
productively with multilateral institutions, prompting David Kaye, a prominent 
 
 21.  See, for example, the active exchange about the ICC by scholars and activists on Open 
Democracy’s openGlobalRights, https://www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/international-
criminal-court; see also Jo & Simmons, supra note 18.  
 22.  See the ICC website for details of ICC investigations and preliminary examinations, available 
at All Situations, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, https://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations 
%20and%20cases/situations/Pages/situations%20index.aspx (last visited Dec. 19, 2015). 
 23.  David SCHEFFER, ALL THE MISSING SOULS: A PERSONAL HISTORY OF THE WAR CRIMES 
TRIBUNALS PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS (2011). 
 24.  Judith Kelley, Who Keeps International Commitments and Why? The International 
Criminal Court and Bilateral Nonsurrender Agreements, 101 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 573, 573–74 ( 2007). 
 25.  Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Refers Situation in Darfur, Sudan, to 
Prosecutor of International Criminal Court, U.N. Press Release SC/8351 (Mar. 31, 2005). 
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legal scholar, to declare that the United States and the ICC had entered a 
“honeymoon” phase.26   
Despite this appearance of increased authority, the ICC’s record has been 
bleak on other dimensions.  The United States has more actively supported the 
ICC, but it has done so as a seemingly permanent nonmember. The Court has 
also struggled to achieve the goals it sets for itself.  Of the roughly thirty-six 
indictments the ICC has issued publicly, less than one-third of those indicted 
have come before the ICC. By autumn of 2015, the ICC had convicted only two 
individuals.27 In several cases, most notably Sudan, Libya, and Kenya, states had 
simply ignored requests to deliver indicted war criminals to The Hague.28 Some 
of the bleakest but least surprising defeats have come from states that have 
blatantly rejected the ICC’s authority. After an arrest warrant for President al-
Bashir of Sudan was issued, Sudan became one of the ICC’s most vocal critics. 
President Bashir openly flouted the ICC arrest warrant against him.29 Human 
rights advocates had hoped that an arrest warrant would marginalize Bashir 
politically.30 Instead, Bashir reconsidered his plans to step down and decided to 
extend his tenure as president.31 
Despite this complicated record, defenders of the ICC point to the large 
number of states that have joined the ICC. In Africa, thirty-four states are 
members of the ICC. Even more strikingly, several African states have referred 
situations in their own territories to the ICC. Because states are under little 
material pressure to join the ICC, and are under even less pressure to refer a 
case to the Court, self-referrals are assumed to be a highly significant indicator 
of the ICC’s authority. In February 2014, Kenneth Roth, Executive Director of 
Human Rights Watch wrote in the New York Review of Books that the very fact 
that five of the eight situations under investigation before the ICC had been 
referred directly by state parties in Africa was an obvious indicator of the ICC’s 
support on the continent.32 
 
 26.  David Kaye, America’s Honeymoon with the ICC, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Apr. 16, 2013), 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2013-04-16/americas-honeymoon-icc. 
 27.  Elizabeth Peet, Why is the International Criminal Court so Bad at Prosecuting War Criminals, 
WILSON QUARTERLY (June 15, 2015), http://wilsonquarterly.com/stories/why-is-the-international-
criminal-court-so-bad-at-prosecuting-war-criminals/. 
 28.  In December 2014, the pre-trial chamber of the ICC issued a noncompliance finding. Press 
Release, International Criminal Court, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi Case: ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I Issues 
Non-Compliance Finding for Libyan Government and Refers Matter to UN Security Council, ICC 
Press Release, ICC-CPI-20141210-PR1074 (Dec. 10, 2014), http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/ 
icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/Pages/PR1074.aspx. 
 29. Bashir has repeatedly denounced the ICC, referring to it as a “colonial court.” See, e.g., Sudan 
President Bashir hails “Victory” over ICC Charges, BBC NEWS (Dec. 13, 2014), http://www.bbc 
.co.uk/news/world-africa-30467167. 
 30.  Selling Justice Short: Why Accountability Matters for Peace, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (July 7, 
2009), https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/07/07/selling-justice-short/why-accountability-matters-peace. 
 31.  SARAH M. H. NOUWEN, COMPLEMENTARITY IN THE LINE OF FIRE: THE CATALYSING 
EFFECT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT IN UGANDA AND SUDAN (2013). 
 32.  Kenneth Roth, Africa Attacks the International Criminal Court, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (Feb. 6, 
2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/feb/06/africa-attacks-international-criminal-
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But to what extent are membership and self-referrals indicators of the 
authority of the ICC? Self-referrals underscore a state’s recognition of the 
ICC’s authority, while also advancing a state’s strategic interests in a specific 
conflict situation. Governments in Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, and Mali have each referred situations in their own territory to the ICC. 
In all of these cases, the ICC has investigated rebel crimes rather than state 
crimes.33 Despite the motivation for referring a situation to the ICC, arrest 
warrants have not necessarily furthered states’ interests and have instead driven 
rebel groups further underground or across borders.34 
Referrals and membership bear a complicated relationship to the ICC’s 
authority. On the one hand, self-referrals reflect the relevance of the ICC as a 
focal point for international criminal justice. In a weak sense, both Security 
Council and self-referrals indicate recognition of ICC authority by state 
officials. The decisions by Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Central African Republic, and Mali to refer situations in their own territories to 
the ICC suggest that these states recognize the ICC’s authority.  
By referring itself to the ICC, a state not only recognizes the authority of the 
Court; it also cedes control over the scale and content of investigations or trials, 
thereby accepting a degree of uncertainty.  States take a calculated risk when 
they refer situations on their own territory to the ICC.  Even if a state’s political 
interests in a particular ICC situation change, members forego formal control 
over the Court yet remain responsible for supporting its efforts. Ugandan 
President Museveni’s decision to refer Uganda to the ICC in 2005 was shaped 
by an ongoing conflict between his government and the Lord’s Resistance 
Army (LRA). It may also have reflected a measured risk that the ICC would 
target the LRA rather than government officials.35 
In reality, though, state support for the ICC’s investigations and arrest 
warrants have continued to depend on politics even after formal referrals are 
made.  By 2006, President Museveni, anxious to secure the LRA’s cooperation 
at peace talks in Juba and fearful that arrest warrants would impede their 
success, urged the ICC to drop charges against the LRA. Despite this about-
face and the government’s new interest in ending the war through negotiation, 
its request fell on deaf ears. The ICC rejected the government’s plea.36 When 
the ICC denied this request, Museveni challenged the ICC’s authority, referring 
to it as an imperial tool of the West. These challenges from the government of 
 
court/. 
 33.  Phil Clark, Law, Politics and Pragmatism: The ICC and Case Selection in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo and Uganda, in COURTING CONFLICT? PEACE, JUSTICE AND THE ICC IN 
AFRICA 42 (Nicholas Waddell & Phil Clark eds., 2008). 
 34.  LRA has safe havens in Sudan, Rights Group Says, VOICE OF AMERICA (May 7, 2013),  
http://www.voanews.com/content/human-rights-groups-say-lra-safe-havens-are-in-sudan/1656124.html. 
 35.  Clark, supra note 33, at 37-46  
 36.  Miša Zgonec-Rožej, Palestine’s ICC Accession: Risks and Rewards, CHATHAM HOUSE: 
ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (Jan. 8, 2015), https://www.chathamhouse 
.org/expert/comment/16604. 
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Uganda to the ICC’s authority continue today.37 
Backlash against the ICC by state parties has been even greater when the 
ICC has proceeded without an invitation, suggesting once again that, at least for 
states, the ICC’s authority is contingent on what the ICC does, rather than on 
what it is. Kenya, a party to the Rome Statute, was no less active in contesting 
the ICC’s authority over its elites than nonstate parties have been, adopting an 
array of tactics to obstruct the ICC’s attempts to investigate the crimes of its 
political elites. Following the election violence in 2007 and 2008, civil society 
organizations in Kenya demanded accountability. When domestic elites failed 
to put perpetrators of post-election violence on trial, Kofi Annan passed an 
envelope containing the names of key perpetrators to the Chief Prosecutor of 
the ICC, who then opened a formal investigation.38 But when arrest warrants 
were issued against a handful of elite Kenyan politicians, rather than accepting 
the ICC’s authority, (then) Deputy Prime Minister Uhuru Kenyatta and (then) 
Minister of Education William Ruto combined forces and launched a campaign 
to bolster their domestic political power and delegitimize the ICC’s authority. 
Kenyatta and Ruto formed an unlikely political coalition, the Jubilee alliance, 
combining forces to mobilize against the ICC and launching a bid for the 
presidency. Their political campaign framed the ICC as an instrument of 
Western imperialism. Kenyatta then used his newly won platform as President 
to mobilize the African Union against the ICC.39 Kenyatta’s success has created 
a climate in which ICC enthusiasts in Kenya have found it increasingly difficult 
to mobilize domestic support for the Court.40 
IV 
GREAT POWERS AND THE POLITICS OF ICC AUTHORITY 
Politics have also shaped the propensity of major powers to acknowledge 
and support the ICC. In Libya, this initially meant something very different 
than it did for Syria. In 2011, there was widespread support for targeted 
sanctions against Libya’s officials and also for referring it to the ICC.   Security 
 
 37.  Uganda’s President Museveni Calls for Africa to Review its Ties with ICC, DAILY NATION 
(Oct. 9, 2015), http://www.nation.co.ke/news/Africa-should-review-ties-with-ICC--Museveni/-
/1056/2480492/-/138otwdz/-/index.html. 
 38.  ICC Press Release, CC - ICC Prosecutor receives Sealed Envelope from Kofi Annan on Post-
Election Violence in Kenya (July 9, 2009), https://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations 
%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200109/press%20releases/Pages/pr436.aspx. 
 39.  Kenya Commits $1mn to ‘Unstoppable’ African Court of Justice, CAPITAL NEWS (Jan. 31, 
2015), http://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2015/01/kenya-commits-1mn-to-unstoppable-african-court-of-
justice/. 
 40.  Is the International Criminal Court a Tool of Western Imperialism? No., CHRISTIAN SCIENCE 
MONITOR (Oct. 15, 2013), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/Africa-Monitor/2013/1015/Is-the-
International-Criminal-Court-a-tool-of-Western-imperialism-No; Walter Menya, State Targeting Us 
Over Support for Hague Cases, Civil Society Protests, DAILY NATION (Oct. 25, 2014), 
http://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/Civil-Society-ICC-Hague-Cases-Jubilee-Government/-
/1064/2499628/-/kylkb4z/-/index.html. 
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Council Resolution 1970 passed easily.41 A second Security Council Resolution 
authorized all necessary means to halt Qaddafi’s imminent attack on Benghazi. 
ICC Chief Prosecutor Ocampo moved swiftly to issue an arrest warrant against 
Colonel Qaddafi. The arrest warrant was issued independently from NATO’s 
military campaign but was broadly compatible with the strategic objectives of 
the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. As the intervention 
continued, though, and NATO’s intervention appeared to many to move 
beyond one of protecting civilians and toward a strategy of regime change, 
support for the intervention dissipated and fractures occurred among members 
of the Security Council. South Africa’s preferences also quickly diverged from 
NATO’s. Under the auspices of the African Union, President Zuma of South 
Africa attempted to negotiate an end to the war with Libya’s leader, Qaddaffi.42 
The African Union rejected the ICC’s arrest warrant against Qaddafi and 
sought a negotiated solution. 
If things moved quickly in Libya, they moved very slowly in Syria. The 
United States was slow to support European efforts to raise the profile of 
accountability for Assad’s crimes in Syria. For nearly a year, it resisted calls to 
sign a letter as part of a European-led initiative to press the Security Council to 
refer Syria to the ICC.43 Within a year, though, the U.S. position had changed. 
This policy change reflected the new facts on the ground in Syria.  Failed peace 
negotiations at the Geneva II peace talks cast a shadow over the United States 
aspiration for a negotiated settlement.44 Photos amassed by a Syrian military 
police photographer who defected, known only as Caesar, were presented to 
Security Council members.45 The United States, under the leadership of 
Ambassador-at-large Rapp, joined a tidal wave of support from other states and 
signed off on Security Council Resolution 1970, referring Libya to the ICC.46 
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The Resolution was vetoed by China and Russia and thus failed to pass. 47 
Despite this apparent failure, within months, the U.S. backing of efforts to 
investigate atrocities in Syria had changed. The dramatic rise of a strategic 
threat from the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria led the U.S. government to 
recalibrate its strong statements against the government of Syria and to pursue 
a more tentative line. Funding for investigations of Assad’s crimes came to an 
end and was not renewed. Instead, the United States decided to fund an 
investigation of Islamic State crimes.48 
In some cases, politics have created an opportunity for human rights 
advocates to push accountability forward.  Following the breakdown of nuclear 
talks on North Korea, a bipartisan consensus emerged in the United States to 
support human rights accountability for North Korea. In February 2014, a 
Commission of Inquiry that had been set up to investigate human rights abuses 
in North Korea released its report. After successful mobilization by a coalition 
of advocates working in partnership with Michael Kirby, who spearheaded the 
report, the United States voted to support a UN General Assembly resolution 
condemning North Korea for its human rights abuses.  The GA Resolution 
requested that the Security Council refer it to the ICC.49 This vote was made 
possible in the United States by the political reality that movement on nuclear 
talks on the Korean Peninsula had been stalled for some time.  This created the 
space for bipartisan consensus on placing North Korea under pressure for its 
appalling human rights record. 
In some cases, membership in the ICC has become a source of contestation.  
In January 2015, following a decision by the UN General Assembly to grant 
Palestine nonstate observer status, the ICC indicated that it would accept a 
request by Palestine for ICC membership. It then confirmed a request under 
Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute to open a preliminary examination dating 
back to June 2014.50 The United States and Israel protested vigorously, naming 
and shaming the PA and challenging the decision by the ICC.51 The United 
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States argued that the situation in Israel and Palestine should be resolved 
through careful negotiation. Instead, the move to join the ICC represented an 
“escalation” on the part of the PA, it claimed. Israel threatened to withhold 
valuable tax revenues from the PA. 
Even where states have succeeded in crossing the referral barrier, this has 
often marked the end rather than the beginning of support for the ICC. Once 
the Security Council referred Sudan and Libya to the ICC, the Security 
Council’s five permanent members (the P5), did little to ensure the success of 
these efforts. The overthrow of the Qaddafi regime brought an end to concerted 
U.S. and NATO engagement in Libya.52 
V  
THE PARADOX OF AUTHORITY 
In his book, Rough Justice, Bosco argues that the ICC has accommodated 
powerful Western states, and especially the United States.53 This 
accommodation tendency threatens to undermine the ICC’s authority among 
many of its most steadfast proponents. The ICC’s proximity to state power, and 
especially to the Security Council, is directly at odds with those among its 
constituents who value the neutrality and impartiality of international justice 
norms in theory as well as in practice. The challenge of balancing power and 
independence was most palpable in the aftermath of NATO’s war in Libya, 
where the proximity between the Security Council, state interests, and 
international criminal justice seemed uncomfortably close for many of the ICC’s 
proponents. Allegations that the ICC had become too closely associated with a 
Western policy of regime change quickly surfaced. In February 2011, the 
Security Council referred Libya to the ICC. Within days, then Chief Prosecutor 
Luis Ocampo opened a formal investigation and by June, Ocampo issued an 
arrest warrant for the leader of Libya, Qaddafi, his son Saif, and the intelligence 
minister, Al-Senussi.54  The speed with which the ICC moved in Libya 
intensified perceptions that power and justice were too closely aligned. 
In the aftermath of NATO’s intervention in Libya, ardent supporters of the 
ICC openly questioned and even challenged the role of the Security Council in 
referring cases to the ICC. Louise Arbour, one of the most prominent 
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supporters of international justice, argued that international justice and 
international politics must be kept on “separate tracks.”55 In Mali also, events 
gave the impression, possibly unfairly, that the ICC had failed to keep a healthy 
distance from policies of western military intervention. The government of Mali 
referred itself to the ICC in 2012. In January, France intervened with military 
force. Five days later, the ICC announced its decision to open a situation in 
Mali.56 
In the aftermath of Libya, Russia, and China have also become more 
assertive in their critiques of the ICC.57 Each of these powers vetoed the 
Resolution calling for Syria to be referred to the ICC.58 When North Korea 
came before the General Assembly for its record of human rights abuses, 
Russia and China once again voiced their opposition to an ICC referral.59 
The ICC’s authority paradox may not be unique. Many international 
institutions recognize the realities of power by granting special privileges to a 
small number of powerful states. This creates an obvious tension with a 
sovereignty norm that prescribes equal status to all states. It is also not unusual 
for this in-built hypocrisy to create tensions in civil society. In the domain of 
international criminal justice, civil society has embraced pragmatic 
compromises. The ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugsolavia and Rwanda 
were products of Security Council Resolutions that directly linked justice to 
peace and security. This proximity between the Security Council and 
international justice was secured in Rome when it was agreed that the Security 
Council could not only refer cases to the ICC, but also defer them. Still, ICC 
authority depends crucially on the pretense, supported by practice, that justice 
will remain free from political interference. 
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